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The Overlap Between Damages For Personal 
Injury And Work Related Benefits 
Richard Lewis * 
This article examines the problem of “collateral benefits” received by an accident 
victim also seeking damages at common law. It does so in the specific context of the 
benefits which may be received by a plaintiff as a result of employment. These 
include, for example, sickness and redundancy payments, and pensions for 
disablement and early retirement. Should such benefits be taken into account to 
reduce the damages payable by the tortfeasor? A steady stream of litigation in the 
last forty years or so has produced a complex set of rules influenced by policies 
which pull in different directions. The rules expose various tensions in the law of tort. 
In particular, they reveal the conflict between the aims of compensation and 
deterrence: the plaintiff is to be compensated only to the full extent of his loss on the 
one hand, and yet on the other the defendant must pay in full and not receive a 
subsidy from a third party.
1
 The cases also reveal uncertainty about how 
employment benefits should be viewed: are they to be deducted because they are 
akin to those publicly provided by the welfare state, or are they to be left out of 
account, as are monies payable under an insurance policy, because they are truly 
private rights, independently negotiated and separately paid for? Do the benefits 
merely duplicate tort by being paid for the same purposes as the damages, or do 
they offer compensation for some additional losses?  
The area has recently been investigated by the Law Commission as part of its 
programme reviewing the law of damages for personal injury. In September 1997 a 
Consultation Paper on collateral benefits was issued which canvassed various 
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options for reform.
2
 The subject is therefore topical. It also constitutes a neglected 
and yet important area of compensation law. Before the Law Commission review 
comparatively little had been written on the subject in spite of the importance of 
coordinating the plethora of compensation schemes for those injured.
 3
 Over fifty 
forms of financial assistance for disablement have been traced.
4
 The series of ad-
hoc schemes exposes the lack of any coherent policy towards the treatment of 
disabled people. Some receive much more help than others even though their needs 
and injuries are the same. It is not only the particular conditions of entitlement which 
cause the inequalities of treatment, but also the differing provisions with regard to 
the receipt of collateral benefits. The fortunate few who are able to obtain 
compensation from the common law are especially well treated. Because of their 
collateral benefits some plaintiffs recover far more than their pecuniary loss.
5
 This 
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waste involved in paying what may amount to double compensation is a feature of 
tort law which has been highlighted by Atiyah.
6
 Although his general views on reform 
of the law are not shared by the present Law Commission, it now recognises   
“ ... the force of the contention that the damages burden should be 
reduced by the amount of the collateral benefits so that money could 
thereby be released to contributors to liability insurance through lower 
premiums, which would in turn potentially increase the funds available 
to achieve better provision for all the ill and injured.”
7
 
The questions posed by collateral benefits therefore lie at the heart of any 
compensation system, and constitute one of the keys to its future direction.  
It has been in the context of work related benefits that courtroom struggles over 
collateral benefits have largely been fought.
8
 Employers today commonly reward 
their employees with a range of “fringe benefits” in addition to pay. These include 
various benefits, some insurance based, offering protection against sickness, 
disablement and early retirement. There are several ways of looking at the 
continuation of monies from an employer after the employee has stopped work 
following injury. The strongest arguments for allowing the employee to retain work 
benefits in addition to the damages awarded are where the payments by the 
employer are viewed as benevolent gifts, or loans to be repaid later, or as quasi 
insurance monies paid for by the employee via his labour. By contrast, the benefits 
are more likely to be deducted if they are seen either as continued wages which, like 
free medical services, in effect can prevent any loss from arising, or as interim 
payments from the tortfeasor and intended to reduce the final bill to be paid. The 
cases reveal judicial uncertainty about which of these perspectives is most 
appropriate. They are each examined in the organisation of the caselaw which 
follows. 
                                            
6
 P. Cane, Atiyah’s Accidents Compensation And The Law (5th ed 1993) pp 322 - 330, and P. S. 
Atiyah, The Damages Lottery (1997) chap 8, and “Personal Injuries In The Twenty First Century: 
Thinking The Unthinkable” in P. Birks (ed) Wrongs And Remedies In The Twenty First Century 
(1996).  
7
 Op cit n 1 para 4.25. 
8
 “It provides a veritable microcosm of all the conflicting views which perplex the whole subject of 
collateral benefits. Indeed the startling lack of uniformity is noticeable not only on the international 
plane as between one country and another. Within each national system rival views are frequently 
locked in contest.” Fleming, “Collateral Benefits” in International Encyclopedia Of Comparative Law 
(Vol. XI) (1986) chap 11-29. 
 4 
(i) Where There Is A Legal Obligation Or Expectation That The       Benefits 
Would Be Repaid 
Monies paid by an employer on condition that they be returned in the event of a 
damages claim proving successful will not be deducted from the plaintiff‟s damages. 
A claim can be made in full because there is no overcompensation; in effect, the 
plaintiff must repay what amounts to a loan. Thus according to Diplock LJ in 
Browning v War Office
9
  
“Cases where the plaintiff has been advanced monies to meet 
expenses occasioned by the accident by a third party upon his 
undertaking to repay the sums advanced, either absolutely or 
conditionally upon his recovering them from the defendant, raise no 
problem. The loss he sustains remains the same irrespective of 
whether he has actually paid the expenses from his own pocket or 
converted them into a liability to a third party.” 
The rule has been supported by law reform bodies,
10
 and continues to receive the 
support of the Law Commission. Although the Commission argues that at one 
extreme all benefits accruing as a result of the accident should be taken into 
account, it continues to except those “where the provider of the collateral benefit has 
a right (by contract or operation of law), which it proposes to enforce, to recover the 
benefit ....”
11
 Therefore, provided the employer could show an intention to recoup the 
money advanced to its employee, the payment would be left out of account even if 
more comprehensive deduction rules were introduced. 
The rule is an important one in practice because it is very common for today‟s 
contracts of employment to contain a clause giving the employer the right to recoup 
sickness payments if the claim for damages proves successful.
12
 However, such 
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clauses were much less usual in the past. In 1949 in Dennis v London Passenger 
Transport Board
13
 the employer did not specifically reserve the right to recoup and 
yet still was said to expect repayment in the event of a successful damages claim. 
Because the employee was thought to owe a moral duty to make repayment, and 
was prepared to give an undertaking that he would do so if full damages were 
awarded, it was held that the monies ought to be included in the damages award. 
However, the court ensured that there would be no double compensation by also 
directing the plaintiff to reimburse the bodies which had advanced him the monies.
14
 
However, in 1973 the Law Commission doubted whether a court had the power to 
direct that the damages be earmarked in this way.
15
 
The right to recoup monies in the event of a successful damages claim need not 
be confined to agreements to continue to pay wages or provide sickness payments 
in the event of injury. It is open to employers to insert similar provisions in their 
pension arrangements as well as any permanent health protection they arrange for 
their employees. Employers have the opportunity to arrange clauses which, in effect, 
reverse the result of cases we are about to consider: they could make pension and 
health payments, and even redundancy payments, deductible from the award of 
damages. However, as yet such clauses are rarely inserted into the relevant 
agreements. This is because of a failure to plan sufficiently for the possibility of a tort 
claim, rather than any inherent problem with the concept of inserting such a clause. 
Much more could be done with the contract of employment in relation to a potential 
claim for damages than has been done to date.  
(ii) Where The Employer Is Also The Defendant 
Where an employer is also the defendant, it is more likely that the monies paid to 
the plaintiff will be considered to be on account of damages, and therefore 
deductible. There is a good public policy reason for this: judges have recognised that 
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employers should be encouraged to make immediate payments to reduce the 
hardship suffered as a result of the loss of earnings following the accident.
16
 For this 
reason the Scottish Law Commission suggested that payments made by tortfeasors 
directly to their victims should be presumed to be on account of damages.
17
 In 
McCamley v Cammell Laird Shipbuilders Ltd
18
 it was suggested that even payments 
characterised as ex gratia should be deducted if they came from a defendant, 
although no account would be taken of them if it could be inferred that the defendant 
wanted the plaintiff to receive full damages as well. Such an approach limits the 
scope of the general rule that benevolent payments are to be disregarded, as 
discussed under the heading after next. However, on the facts of McCamley the 
judges were able to infer that the ex gratia payment, even though made by the 
defendant, was intended to be in addition to any damages awarded later so that the 
plaintiff, in fact, obtained double payment.  
However, this tendency to deduct from damages payments made by a defendant 
cannot be raised to a rule of law. Several recent cases have required employers to 
pay more money irrespective of the sums already advanced. The intention of the 
payor is crucial and, as noted under the next heading, it is the nature of the 
payments that matters more than the source. This was again emphasised in Smoker 
v London Fire Authority
19
 which rejected the employer‟s suggestion that pension 
monies should be deducted if the defendant was also the employer. Parry v Cleaver, 
the leading case against deduction, was not to be distinguished on that ground. The 
pension monies and the head of damages being claimed were sufficiently distinct for 
both to be payable even though both were funded by the employer. Overall, 
however, there is uncertainty here. The Law Commission conclude that the law in 
relation to gratuitous payments by tortfeasors is unclear.
20
 A solution would be to 
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adopt the option for reform it puts forward which deducts all such payments unless 
the employer reserved a right to recoup the money from any later damages award. 
However, other options being considered by the Commission include, firstly, 
exempting charitable payments from any wider deduction rule and, secondly, 
examining the intentions of the provider of the benefit. These options would 
inevitably continue the uncertainty of what is to happen where benefits are provided 
by an employer who is also the defendant. 
(iii) The Intrinsic Nature Of The Benefits Compared To The Head Of Damages 
It is more likely that collateral payments will be taken into account to reduce 
damages if they are of the same nature as the sums lost because of the accident. 
As Lord Reid noted in Parry v Cleaver:
 21
 
“Surely the distinction between receipts which must be brought into 
account and those which must not must depend not on their source but 
on their intrinsic nature.” 
Do the employment benefits replace losses specifically taken into account as items 
under one of the heads of damages? If so, they are likely to be deducted, as where 
payments covering sick pay and lost wages were deducted from the earnings loss in 
Hussain v New Taplow Mills.
22
 By contrast there will be no deduction from that head 
of damage if the additional benefits are paid for loss of a pension, especially if the 
latter is viewed as containing an element of investment for the future akin to life 
assurance and thus quite different from compensation for earnings loss. Similarly a 
pension derived from insurance may be deducted from damages specifically related 
to the loss of a retirement pension, but not from the damages awarded for the 
different kind of loss involving earnings interruption. It was for this reason that the 
pension was payable in addition to damages for lost earnings in Parry v Cleaver, a 
case discussed in detail below. However, it is by no means easy to agree the nature 
and purpose of certain collateral benefits. Thus, in contrast to Parry, the Law 
Commission take the view that a disablement pension replaces lost earnings, and 
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because this is the same kind of loss as that met by the damages award, it should 
be deducted from it.
23
   
(iv) Ex Gratia Payments From The Employer 
Here the dilemma is whether to treat the payment as a continuation of wages or 
as a gift, the first being deductible, the second not. The present rule is that no 
account is to be taken of the plaintiff‟s receipt of charitable or benevolent 
payments.
24
 The fact that it is the employer that provides such assistance seems to 
have made little difference, and in general therefore it is the gift analogy that has 
prevailed.
 25
 However, there is an exception if the employer is also the defendant. 
We have seen that there is then a tendency to regard the payment as an advance 
on damages. The Pearson Commision agreed that ex gratia payments should not be 
deducted except where the employer is also the defendant.
26
 It has been with the 
scope of this exception and with establishing the intent of the employer that recent 
litigation has been concerned. 
A pension in lieu of wages 
The payment of a pension was considered to be ex gratia and left out of account 
in Cunningham v Harrison
27
 In this case the plaintiff was injured in a road accident 
and left tetraplegic. His employers paid him a full salary for ten months as they were 
bound to do under his contract of employment. This could be deducted from 
damages. However, the employers generously continued to make ex gratia 
payments amounting to half the plaintiff‟s salary and they intended to continue to do 
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so for the rest of the plaintiff‟s life. The Court of Appeal held that these payments 
were to be left out of account. Lord Denning stated: 
“It is an uncovenanted benefit coming to the plaintiff over and above 
the compensation recoverable at law. In this case he receives from his 
employers virtually half pay for the rest of his days. No one grudges 
him this money: but there it is. It is voluntary. He gets it and it is not to 
be taken into account.” 
28
  
 
Payment on retirement 
In Connolly v Tesco’s Stores
29
 it was held that a payment made by a brewery to 
the tenant of a public house was an ex gratia payment which would have been made 
whenever the tenant retired. It was therefore to be left out of account and not treated 
as if it were a redundancy payment resulting from the accident when, as discussed 
below, it would have been deducted. 
Insurance payment for disablement 
The proceeds of an insurance policy taken out by an employer for employees 
(who were unaware of its existence and paid nothing towards its cost) was 
characterised as an act of benevolence from the employer akin to a charitable 
payment and therefore left out of account in assessing damages in McCamley v 
Cammell Laird Shipbuilders Ltd.
30
 This was in spite of the fact that, unlike in 
Cunningham’s case above, the employer advancing the payments was also the 
defendant responsible for paying the damages. McCamley involved a personal 
accident policy taken out by British Shipbuilders on behalf of themselves and their 
subsidiary companies, including the defendant company, and extending the benefits 
towards all their employees, described as “the insured persons.” The policy provided 
for a lump sum to be paid in the event of death, loss of limbs, sight, or permanent 
total disablement from the usual occupation. The lump sum was based on a multiple 
of the insured‟s annual wages, but unlike the cases in the next section, it was not 
paid directly in substitution for wages. Because of the company‟s admitted 
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negligence in the course of launching an oil rig the plaintiff suffered severe injury, 
losing part of both an arm and a leg. The insurers paid a sum of £45,000 to the 
defendant company who, in turn, forwarded it to the plaintiff‟s solicitors, specifically 
stating that it was to be credited against the eventual award of damages. The 
plaintiff contested this set off. 
The Court of Appeal held in favour of the plaintiff. Although it refused to accept 
that the arrangement could fall within the well established insurance exception to the 
rule that benefits should be deducted,
31
 it held that it came within a second 
exception concerning money received from an act of benevolence.      
“The payment was not an ex gratia act where the accident had already 
happened, but the whole idea of the policy, covering all the many 
employees of British Shipbuilders and its subsidiary companies, was 
clearly to make the benefit payable as an act of benevolence whenever 
a qualifying injury took place.” 
It  did not matter that the arrangement was made before the accident took place - it 
was a contingent act of benevolence. But it was important, firstly, that the insurance 
proceeds were payable irrespective of whether the accident involved fault or resulted 
in common law liability and, secondly, that the monies did not duplicate directly any 
of the heads of the damages claim. This made it easier to justify keeping separate 
the damages the defendant was required to pay in tort. 
Finally, it may be of some importance that the plaintiff had no right to the 
insurance payments because this made them distinguishable from sickness 
payments due under contracts of employment in other cases. There was no 
contractual right to the lump sum for the disablement unlike, for example, in 
Hussain’s case discussed in the next section. It was recognised in Browning v The 
War Office
32
 that it would not be fair to take into account compensation to which the 
plaintiff had no right “seeing that, as soon as the compensation is awarded by the 
court, the employer may cut off or cut down the pension.” 
In spite of these attempts to confine McCamley, the case appears extremely 
favourable to plaintiffs, and marks the most recent high water mark of the approach 
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favouring the cumulation of benefits. It extends Cunningham by applying the ex 
gratia rule to an employer who is also the defendant, and in spite of the fact that the 
employer asked for the payment to be credited against any later award of damages. 
Insurance payment for death 
Although McCamley was not cited, the same result was achieved in Bews v 
Scottish Hydro-Electric.
33
 The defendant employers were liable for negligently 
causing the death of one of their employees. They had taken out an insurance policy 
on the life of their employees, and they alone paid the premiums. However, the 
£54,000 they received under this policy was forwarded by them to the deceased‟s 
estate. Their liability insurers later claimed that this large sum should be set off from 
the damages that they were required to pay. However, it was held that the sum 
received by the estate was an ex gratia payment from the employers and was not 
intended to be on account of damages. The estate thus obtained double 
compensation, and received the same money as it would have done if the deceased 
had paid the premiums himself. Although the case purported to follow Cunningham v 
Harrison, it extended it to where the employer is also the defendant.  
 (v) Continuation Of Wages And Payment Of Sickness Benefits 
The Potential Extent Of The Overlap 
An employer may continue to pay an employee while he is absent from work 
following his accident. Almost nine out of ten full-time employees benefit from some 
kind of occupational sick pay scheme if their earnings are interrupted for a short time 
as a result of injury or, more commonly, illness.
34
 However, this figure can be 
misleading.
35
 Coverage is partial and excludes the self-employed and part-time 
workers. The more likely beneficiaries are the better paid and, in particular, those in 
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white collar jobs in larger organisations. Those least likely to benefit, or to benefit for 
only a short time, are lower paid manual workers employed by small firms. If an 
employer operates a scheme, it is likely that up to ten per cent of employees will not 
qualify for payment from it. This is because they may not have worked long enough 
or they may have exhausted their entitlement.
 36
 
How much money is received by those who are members of such schemes? 
Although one survey reported that over three quarters of those receiving sick pay 
had their full pay made up for at least a part of their absence,
37
 the Law Commission 
found that of those who returned to their pre-accident job only a third reported 
received full pay during their absence, and a quarter received no pay at all.
38
 
The Basic Rule  
If the employer neither reserves the right nor expects to reclaim the monies 
advanced, and these monies are not characterised as ex gratia payments intended 
to be additional to damages, the plaintiff is unable to claim them again from the 
tortfeasor as damages for lost earnings. This is because 
“... the servant has not then suffered any loss of pay, and the 
wrongdoer cannot be liable for what the servant has not lost.”
39
 
Thus in Turner v Ministry of Defence
40
 the plaintiff was required to give credit for the 
sick pay which he received from his employer. Parry v Cleaver suggests that it 
makes no difference whether the sickness payments are voluntary or contractual as 
long as they retain the character of being wages.
41
 The Pearson Commission 
confirmed that occupational sick pay should be taken into account unless there is a 
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requirement either in the contract of service or in an agreement for the loan of the 
money, that the employer is to be refunded from any damages recovered.
42
 
Wages Or A Benefit Akin To Insurance? 
The question which arises here is what constitutes sickness payments which are 
to be deducted from damages as if they are wages, as opposed to benefits akin to 
insurance which are not to be deducted because the employee has indirectly paid 
for them? In Hussain v New Taplow Paper Mills
43
 the plaintiff had lost an arm 
because of the negligence of his employer. He continued to work for the same firm 
but in a different job. For the first thirteen weeks after his accident his employer paid 
his wages in full. It was agreed that this sick pay was deductible from damages. 
However, under his contract of employment he was then entitled to further payments 
equal to half his pre-accident earnings. These payments were to continue 
irrespective of whether he continued to work for the employer. The employer 
obtained reimbursement of these sums under the provisions of a permanent health 
insurance policy taken out on all its employees but funded by the employer alone. 
Were these additional sums also to be treated as if they were sick pay and thus to 
be deducted from damages?  
The House of Lords held that they were to be taken into account because the 
payments, whether made for long or short term disability, were indistinguishable 
from the uninsured sick pay forwarded in lieu of wages for the first thirteen weeks. 
The basic character of these payments was unaffected by the fact that the 
defendant employer took the precaution of insuring against the possibility of having 
to make them. The payments remained a partial substitute for earnings and as such 
were of the same nature as the sums lost. Their Lordships therefore distinguished 
the case of a pension payable only after employment ceased and which was 
unrelated to the interruption in earnings as was said to be the case in Parry v 
Cleaver.  
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The plaintiff had argued that the payments were more in the nature of insurance 
or pension payments rather than wages, especially as the disability was permanent, 
and entitlement would continue even if the plaintiff were to change his job or the 
employer were to go into liquidation. Rejecting this argument Lord Bridge stated: 
“It positively offends my sense of justice that a plaintiff, who has 
certainly paid no insurance premiums as such, should receive full 
wages during a period of incapacity to work from two different sources, 
his employer and the tortfeasor. It would seem to me still more unjust 
and anomalous where, as here, the employer and the tortfeasor are 
one and the same.”
44
 
 
Hussain was followed in Page v Sheerness Steel
45
 where it was again emphasised 
that in order for the employee to obtain the permanent health insurance monies as 
well as damages he must contribute, either directly or indirectly, to the cost of the 
insurance. 
Further Criticism And Suggested Reform Of The Distinction Between Sick Pay And  
Disablement Pensions  
The result of the above cases is that there is a sharp distinction between sick pay, 
which is to be deducted, and a disablement pension, which is not. Lord Reid in Parry 
argued that the rationale for the distinction is that sick pay is a reward for 
contemporaneous work, whereas the pension is payment for past work. The Law 
Commission is very critical of this view and suggests that the attempt to characterise 
the payments as different in kind is difficult to sustain.
46
 First, it notes that it is 
possible to receive sick pay for a very long time - perhaps many months, or even 
years. An extreme example is Page v Sheerness Steel where the payments were to 
last for life. In such cases it is very hard to see the payments as a reward for 
contemporary work. Secondly, the Commission argues that both the pension and 
sick pay are  
                                            
44
 Ibid at p 532. 
45
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PIQR Q 1 
46
 Consultation Paper Collateral Benefits (1997) paras 2.105 - 2.109. Similarly Ogus, The Law Of 
Damages (1973) p 227.  
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“... remuneration and therefore by definition to replace lost earnings. If 
Lord Reid accepted that both sums were paid for by the plaintiff, it is 
hard to see how he could maintain a distinction in the way the two are 
treated in the calculation of damages. The point is reflected in the view 
of other judges that a distinction in the treatment of sick pay and 
disablement pensions cannot rely upon whether they are paid for by 
the plaintiff or not. ”
47
 
 The Commission suggest that Hussain demonstrates the fragility of the distinction: 
apart from the fact that the long-term sickness benefit was paid prior to termination 
of employment, it was indistinguishable from a disablement pension. It seems wrong 
to treat the two collateral benefits differently only because of their different names 
when, by their nature, they are very similar. The Commission conclude that this is 
the most striking inconsistency in the present law.
48
 It proposes a number of options 
for reform, but describes the suggestion that disablement pensions be treated the 
same as sick pay - both to be deductible - as the most limited of the reforms it puts 
forward.  
Net Or Gross Repayment To Employer? 
In Franklin v British Railways Board
49
 after suffering an injury for which his 
employer was responsible the plaintiff was unable to work for a year. During that 
time he received sick pay under the terms of a contract which required him to repay 
the employer from any damages he later received. This meant that the sick pay was 
ignored for the purpose of calculating damages, and from that lump sum the plaintiff 
then repaid the amount of sick pay he had received. However, his employer then 
requested that he also reimburse the tax and national insurance contributions which 
had been paid to the Revenue and the DSS under the PAYE system. In effect this 
claim for the gross pay not only would have required the plaintiff to repay sums he 
had not actually received, but it also would have put the onus of obtaining the 
relevant rebates upon him rather than the employer. The Court of Appeal rejected 
the argument and held that only the net amount of sick pay had to be repaid. Sir 
Thomas Bingham commented: 
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“... I would find it surprising if the employee were obliged by his 
conditions of service to „repay‟ money he had never had. Every 
consideration of convenience and fairness would indicate the Board 
and not the employee as the appropriate party to recover sums 
overpaid to departments of government and as the party who should 
be out of pocket during any period of delay.” 
However, he conceded that it might still be possible to draft a loan clause which 
required gross repayment. 
 (vi) Pensions 
About four out of five people in full time work are members of either an 
occupational or personal pension scheme.
50
 Almost all of these schemes provide for 
payment in the event of forced retirement from work because of illness or injury. It 
has been in this area of pensions that the trend towards deduction of benefit has 
been most opposed. Pensions have been seen as different in kind from earnings 
because, for example, they may be paid irrespective of earnings loss. The policy 
arguments have treated pensions, unlike sick pay, as a form of insurance for which 
the employee has paid by his labour. Many pensions in fact are backed by some 
form of insurance arrangement. However, recent cases have retreated a little from 
applying this analogy and have deducted long term benefits if they can be seen as a 
substitution for earnings. In line with this trend we have already noted the Law 
Commission‟s criticism that the distinction between the treatment of sick pay and 
disablement pensions is the most striking inconsistency in the present law. Its most 
limited option for reform is that both should be deductible on the basis that both in 
effect substitute for loss of earnings.
51
 It similarly considers that the primary function 
of a retirement pension is to meet income loss which results from stopping work. 
Even though there is an element of investment in a retirement pension, the 
Commission thinks that this is insufficient for it to be seen as savings rather than 
income replacement, and it therefore suggests that it be deducted.
52
 This proposal 
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for extensive deduction of pensions provided by the employer is in line with what 
currently happens in relation to criminal injuries compensation.
53
  
However, the present common law is far removed both from the statutory scheme 
of criminal injuries compensation and from the policy which the Law Commission 
would like to see in force. The focal point of the law remains the 1969 House of 
Lords decision of  Parry v Cleaver.
54
 This major case deals not only with whether 
pension monies are to be deducted from damages, but also with matters of general 
principle relevant to other collateral benefits. The facts of the case concerned a 
police constable who, whilst directing traffic, was so severely injured in a car 
accident that he had to give up his job. The question arose as to whether the 
pension to which he was entitled on being discharged from the police force for 
disablement should be deducted from his damages for lost earnings. By a bare 
majority, their Lordships overturned the decision of the Court of Appeal
55
 and held 
that the disability pension was not to be set off from damages for lost earnings. 
Whereas the minority thought that the pension resembled a form of sick pay, the 
majority considered it to be more like insurance monies which the policeman had 
paid for, either directly in the form of contributions, or indirectly in lieu of higher 
wages. 
Assisted especially by Australian authorities,
56
 their Lordships thus resolved some 
of the uncertainty which had existed following two previous Court of Appeal 
decisions. In Payne v Railway Executive
57
 the court held that a naval pension which 
the Minister had a discretionary power to withhold or reduce, was not deductible 
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from damages, whereas in Browning v War Office
58
 the plaintiff was required to give 
credit for a disability pension that he was receiving from the United States 
government. In the latter case the court relied upon the House of Lords decision in 
British Transport Commission v Gourley
59
 which emphasised the principle that 
damages are to be compensatory rather than punitive. However, Browning was 
disapproved in Parry and the conflict in approach resolved in favour of the plaintiff. 
In spite of this, litigation has continued from time to time based on the particular 
terms of individual pension schemes, and upon how the distinction between 
pensions and sickness payments is to be applied in practice.
60
  
The Insurance Analogy And The Intrinsic Nature Of The Payments 
Both Lords Reid and Pearce in Parry treated pensions as if they were a form of 
insurance. They did not think it mattered whether the employee contributes to the 
pension or not for, in effect, his labour was taken as a sufficient indirect contribution. 
The Pearson Commission later agreed that both occupational disability and 
permanent health monies should be left out of account because such long-term 
cover should be considered part of the employee‟s remuneration.
61
 In emphasising 
the insurance comparison Lord Reid stated: 
“The products of the sums paid into the pension fund are in fact 
delayed remuneration for ... current work. That is why pensions are 
regarded as earned income. But the man does not get back in the end 
the accumulated sums paid into the fund on his behalf. This is a form 
of insurance. Like every other kind of insurance, what he gets back 
depends on how things turn out .... So, if insurance benefits are not 
deductible ... why should his pension be deductible?” 
 
In his strong criticism of the case Atiyah argues that what employees buy in such 
cases is the right to cover against uncompensated loss of income, and they are not 
deprived of this right if the pension is deducted from their damages any more than if 
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they go through their working lives uninjured.
62
 The result of the case was that the 
plaintiff obtained his civilian wages, a police pension, social security benefits and the 
damages awarded. He was thus much better off than if he had not been injured. 
Atiyah asks how can this be justified when most accident victims fail to obtain any 
compensation from tort at all?  
Following his insurance analogy Lord Reid in Parry continued: 
“A pension is intrinsically of a different kind from wages .... [W]ages are 
a reward for contemporary work, but ... a pension is the fruit, through 
insurance, of all the money which was set aside in the past in respect 
of his past work. They are different in kind.” 
Because of this difference the majority held that it was wrong to deduct the pension 
from damages for lost earnings. This was followed in Smoker v London Fire 
Authority
63
even though the payments were made directly by an employer rather than 
derived from an insurance policy. By contrast, in Hussain the sick pay substituting 
for earnings while employment continued was deducted from damages for lost 
wages. This was because it was of the same nature as the damages, and was said 
to be very different from a pension payable after employment has ceased, as was 
the case in Parry. However, as we have seen the Law Commission reject this 
distinction and would deduct pensions as well as sick pay because both substitute 
for lost income. 
Deducting Early Receipt Of A Pension Against Damages For Loss Of Pension 
In emphasising the particular purpose of the payments, their Lordships accepted 
in Parry that although the pension could not be deducted against damages for lost 
earnings, it could be deducted against any claim for the loss of retirement pension 
from the date the plaintiff was expected to retire.
64
 Lord Reid noted that it would not 
matter even if the pension at that date was labeled as being for incapacity rather 
than retirement. The labels were of no consequence if, in effect, after the normal 
retirement date the two pensions were of the same kind. Strictly deduction is not in 
                                            
62
 ”Collateral Benefits Again” (1969) 32 MLR 397. 
63
 [1991] 2 AC 502. 
64
 [1970] AC 1,  per Lord Reid at p 20, Lord Pearce at p 33, and Lord Wilberforce at p 42. Their views 
were supported by the Pearson Commission op cit n 10 para 523. 
 20 
issue, for it is not as if the plaintiff is receiving a new benefit; instead what must be 
measured is the additional amount of retirement pension that would have been 
received if the injury had not occurred. 
However, litigation has continued since Parry in order to determine whether the 
lesser lump sum pension and periodical payments received early, before normal 
retirement, can be credited against the award of damages for pension loss after the 
normal retirement date. Although the problem was not discussed in Parry, the early 
payments were not credited against pension loss in that case. On the one hand, if 
the early pension is considered to be the fruit of insurance and is in a separate 
parcel from the post retirement insurance, it can be argued that the plaintiff has 
purchased his incapacity pension and the money is not to be set off, even against 
his claim for loss of retirement pension.  On the other hand, it can be argued that 
credit should be given because at least part of the payments are of the same 
“intrinsic nature” as the pension loss. 
Following Parry there were a number of largely unreported decisions adopting 
differing approaches.
65
 Generally, although no credit was given for the early receipt 
of the periodic pension,
66
 there was credit for the early lump sum payment. As a 
result the plaintiff who could afford not to commute his pension into a lump sum was 
better off than the impecunious plaintiff who had been forced to do so. Appellate 
guidance finally came in the case of Longden v British Coal. 
67
 Relying especially 
upon the insurance justification for the cumulation of benefit, the Court of Appeal 
found in favour of the plaintiff by refusing to deduct either the pension or the lump 
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sum.
68
 Roch LJ considered that the plaintiff had purchased the incapacity benefit, 
and therefore, as in Parry and Smoker, it should not be set off.  
Tax And Pensions 
In Cox v Lancashire County Council
 69
 a fireman received a pension on being 
invalided out of the fire service. He set up his own business as a French polisher. 
The tax he would have to pay on his income was greater because of the amount he 
received by way of pension.  In calculating his net loss of income the question arose 
as to whether to deduct the lower amount of tax due upon his business income 
alone, or whether to include the higher tax which resulted from the addition of his 
pension.  The defendants argued that if the pension was to be deducted from the 
damages, it must also be disregarded when calculating tax payable on net income 
loss. However, the judge found in favour of the plaintiff by taking into account the 
plaintiff‟‟s actual tax position and not the notional lower amount of tax he would have 
had to pay on his business income alone. His net loss of income was therefore 
greater, and his damages were increased to take account of it. 
(vii) Redundancy And Severance Payments 
In the Law Commission survey just over half of those injured never returned to the 
job they were doing before the accident. Some of these people decided to resign or 
retire, but a quarter of them had been made redundant.
70
  If any  redundancy 
payment is to be deducted from damages the defendant must establish that the 
plaintiff‟s injury is the cause in fact of his redundancy. This means that the payment 
is not to be deducted if the job is lost for reasons other than the injury suffered. 
Although all depends upon the facts in the particular case, normally redundancy 
payments are made in relation to a pool of employees and are not related to an 
individual‟s injury or incapacity. In such a case causation cannot be established and 
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the redundancy payments must be left out of account as in Mills v Hassall.
71
 
However, this may not lead to an increase in damages: if the plaintiff was going to 
lose his job in any event his claim for loss of earnings may be reduced. 
Failure to establish causation is illustrated by the case of Connolly v Tesco’s 
Stores.
72
 A brewery gave the injured plaintiff an ex gratia payment upon his 
retirement from the tenancy of a public house. It was a payment to the advantage of 
the brewery because it enabled them to establish a managed as opposed to a 
tenanted public house. It was found that the payment was made not because of the 
injury to the plaintiff but would have been made whenever he retired. As a result it 
was not to be taken into account in the assessment of damages. 
There are two cases, Wilson v National Coal Board
73
 and Colledge v Bass 
Mitchells & Butler,
74
 where it was shown that the injury caused the redundancy 
payment, and it was accepted that an offset from damages should be made. 
Causation was established in Wilson even though a pool of other employees were 
also made redundant. The plaintiff had been injured in a colliery accident. Although 
permanently unable to resume work, the plaintiff was retained as an employee until 
the colliery was closed down a year later and he was then made redundant. Unlike 
other employees in the pool he was not able to accept the alternative employment 
on offer at a neighbouring colliery. As a result the House of Lords held that the 
payment should be deducted from his damages. 
However, even if it is clear that the employee is made redundant because of the 
tortious injury it has been suggested that the character of the redundancy payment 
may prevent its deduction from any damages for loss of earnings. In Wilson several 
of their Lordships suggested that their decision to deduct was exceptional and based 
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on its own facts. Lord Scarman contrasted the different nature of redundancy 
payments with a claim for lost earnings: 
“A redundancy payment is compensation for loss of a settled job: 
Hindle v Percival Boats Ltd.
75
 It is not ordinarily a compensation for 
loss of future earnings: for it is payable even when a man finds another 
job at the same or higher wage immediately after his dismissal. It 
provides a fund which is available to help during a period of 
disturbance and resettlement .... In many cases, therefore, it would not 
be reasonable or just to deduct it from damages paid to compensate 
him for loss of future earnings. 
But in some cases it will be reasonable to deduct it .... In such a case 
as the present, deduction accords with public policy for it will 
encourage employers to keep on injured employees after their accident 
instead of dismissing them because of their injuries.” 
 
Despite these reservations about the nature of the payment, the Court of Appeal 
in Colledge again deducted the redundancy monies. Although Sir John Donaldson 
saw the force of Lord Scarman‟s argument, he thought that in order for the plaintiff to 
succeed he would have to show that he was entitled to a head of damage for loss of 
a job - for which the redundancy payment is designed. Loss of future earnings could 
then be treated quite separately. But there was no such head of damage, with the 
result that the loss had to be included in compensation for future earnings. This then 
apparently necessitated the deduction of the redundancy payment. Donaldson could 
envisage no situation in which the payment would not be deducted other than where 
causation could not be proved. The Law Commission agree with this analysis,
76
 and 
offer the further justification that, although it might be difficult to pin down precisely 
for what purpose a redundancy payment is made, it is at least closely analogous to 
compensation for loss of earnings, and therefore should be deducted from it.
77
 
CONCLUSION 
This article has explored the rules relating to an area of law which forms one of 
the important battlegrounds in the future development of compensation for personal 
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injury. The inter-relationship of compensation schemes is crucial in understanding 
the extent and fairness of the provision made for those incapacitated and disabled in 
society. However, in spite of its importance and of continued litigation in the area, 
little attention has been paid to the conflicting policy bases which have given rise to 
the disputes on collateral benefits. As a result, the ad hoc rules which have 
developed reflect confusion and uncertainty. There is now some hope that these 
problems will diminish and that a more coherent set of rules will be developed as a 
result of the reform process instituted by the Law Commission. This article, by 
looking only at the benefits related to work, has covered the key area where the 
major decisions must be made and the policies formulated.  
Although the Law Commission Consultation Paper considers a wide range of 
options for reform, it  generally favours increasing the extent that benefits are 
deducted. Its most comprehensive option is very attractive to those who espouse 
Atiyah-like concern about the equity and rationality in present compensation 
arrangements. It is that all collateral benefits should be deducted from damages.
78
 
The attraction of moving completely away from the nineteenth century policy of 
allowing plaintiffs to cumulate monies from different sources is that it avoids one of 
the more wasteful aspects of the present tort system. If the monies saved could then 
be distributed to a wider group of disabled people suffering the same injuries then 
the reform would indeed have many supporters. However, achieving such a transfer 
of resources is easier said than done. This article therefore prompts the following 
final question: should a welfarist reviewing the tort system support cuts in damages 
now in the hope of the more equitable reallocation of these resources at some later 
date, or should a defence be mounted of the existing relatively high level of support 
given to the fortunate few who succeed in their common law claim? The dilemma, 
frequently encountered when piecemeal reforms of our welfare system are 
considered, is an acute one.  
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